Arzamanova Tatiana Vladimirovna – Leading Editor, INION RAS
The renaissance of right-wing forces in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century, followed by a significant rise of right-wing populist organizations, perceived by European institutions as an unconditional disintegration impulse, did not bypass Germany either. However, the flagship of the German right-wing populism Alternative for Germany (AfD), both in its genesis and in the specifics of the current stage of party development, differs significantly from its European «colleagues» on the right flank, largely due to the cultivation in Germany a memory policy in relation to the tragic events of World War II, based on a sense of collective guilt and responsibility, which resulted in an wary attitude towards the far-right agenda. At the same time, the AfD, like many European right-wing populist associations, realizes the protest potential of the electorate, defining itself as the mouthpiece of protest forces, but does not seek to oppose itself to the authorities; on the contrary, it is focused on entering the government at the federal level. To achieve this goal, AfD is making some efforts to «normalize» the right-wing agenda in Germany and give the party a more restrained conservative image amid growing accusations of extremism. Meanwhile, an extremely important variable in this equation is the iconic feature of Germany’s political culture, which in all its manifestations remains a reflection of the «representative cast» of the West German social model and mentality: that is, «normality» in German politics is defined by the degree of conformity with the political culture of the Bonn Republic, i.e. a homogeneous middle-class society, for which, according to the definition of German sociologists, neither the left nor the right flanks of the political field are the «norm». In these conditions, despite the steady «growth» in the party’s popularity, as evidenced by opinion polls since September 2022, the transformation of the AfD, whose basic electorate is located in the east of Germany and is still not very integrated into West German political culture, into one of the mainstream parties and its exit from the political periphery seems extremely unlikely, – especially taking into account the fact that in the context of a «cancellation culture» in relation to Russia taking root in German politics and public discourse, the AfD maintains a generally pro-Russian position (although it is obviously tightening its rhetoric towards Russia as the Ukrainian conflict escalates and the crisis in relations between Russia and the West deepens). However, the very fact that at the moment the AfD agenda has largely turned out to be in the focus of public discourse in Germany, induced by the crisis in the economy, especially noticeable in the context of insufficient social depreciation and the absence of a broad consensus on a new foreign policy agenda, requires urgent attention from systemic parties.
Germany, right-wing populism, globalization, frustrations, Alternative for Germany (AfD), CDU, SPD, Austrian Freedom Party, extremism, Ukrainian crisis, Russia–West conflict, cancellation culture, political culture, memory policy.
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