Arzamanova Tatiana Vladimirovna – Leading Editor, INION RAS
The article is devoted to the analysis of specifics of Germany's strategy towards China; main emphasis is on determining the locus of opportunities, which allows Berlin to maintain a certain difference between the doctrinal formulation of the government strategy and real steps in that direction. In the context of the current consolidation of the states of the «collective West» and the strengthening of the transatlantic component of their foreign policy in connection with a change in the geopolitical context after 2022, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Germany to maintain the previous fairly high level of foreign policy autonomy on the Chinese track due to the increasing pressure from the United States demanding that its allies to toughen their position towards China. Taking into account the existing framework conditions – growing geopolitical tensions, degradation of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, destruction of global supply chains, increasing protectionism, reformatting of the global energy market, securitization of the economy on a global scale – Germany has little room for maneuver on the Chinese track. However, Berlin still demonstrates an ambivalent position on cooperation with Beijing: «doctrinal» transfer from traditional balancing in relations with China to a more principled policy is combined with efforts to avoid aggravation of bilateral relations. Germany cannot ignore the importance of trade and economic ties between the two countries, especially in a situation where the driver of German economic growth – exports – is showing a steady decline, there are signs of recession and even the beginning of deindustrialization, and Germany’s dependence on raw materials from the PRC is such that the severance of ties (de-cupling) with China, which Washington demands, would have disastrous consequences for the German economy. In the course of multifactorial analysis, the author comes to the conclusion that Berlin still has a small space for maneuver. The main reasons for this are the actual reduction in escalation on the US-China track (in the form of a «managed confrontation»), as well as the fact that there is still no broad «anti-Chinese» consensus in Germany. However, in the future, Berlin will have to take into account that Beijing’s policy towards European countries is also becoming more principled: China has drawn a new «red line», which correlates with the line of the EU’s announced strategy of «minimizing risks» from cooperation with the PRC.
Germany, China, USA, US–China rivalry, EU, Russia, Euro-Atlantic security, Ukrainian crisis, Indo-Pacific region, O. Scholz, Xi Jinping, public opinion surveys.
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