Trunov Philipp Olegovich – PhD in Political Sciences, Leading Researcher, INION RAN
Germany has set a course towards establishing its full-fledged military-political presence in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR), and therefore Berlin had to define the parameters of the country’s approach to the rivalry between the United States and China. If in 2021 Germany had taken rather uncertain position on this issue, then in 2022–2023 it naturally began to participate in the deterrence of the PRC. At a conceptual level, this is reflected in its national security strategies (directly related to its China policy). The article shows the significance of Joe Biden’s decisions to withdraw the US troops from Afghanistan and to create a system of anti-Chinese formats in the Pacific Ocean (AUKUS, «Partners in the Blue Pacific», the «triangle» South Korea – the USA – Japan) for Germany’s involvement in the rivalry with China. In the FRG – PRC dialogue, growing disagreements were manifested at high-level meetings and intergovernmental consultations (the intergovernmental meeting in Berlin in June 2023 did not help to reduce tensions). Germany’s attempts to become one of the «bridges» in the US–China contacts were ineffective. At the same time, Germany set a course for rapprochement with China’s opponents, showing particular interest not only in contacts with the United States, but also in interaction with Japan, Australia and Singapore, both politically and militarily. Germany has consistently tested the deployment of Bundeswehr forces in the ITR: a frigate (2021–2022), a group of aircraft (2022) and ground units (2023). By the mid-2020s, it becomes obvious that Germany is gradually but consistently moving towards creating a system of its strategic presence in the Far East with an anti-Chinese orientation.
Germany, China, USA, Indo-Pacific region, Far East, rivalry, deterrence, negotiations, Bundeswehr, Japan, Australia, Singapore
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