Makarkin Alexey Vladimirovich – Professor, National Research University «Higher School of Economics», First Vice-President of the Center for Political Technologies (Moscow).
The main characteristic of Polish and Hungarian foreign policy under the governments of Law and Justice and Fidesz, respectively, is Euroscepticism, public confrontation with the European bureaucracy while maintaining membership in the EU. This political course, which the governments of Poland and Hungary are actively using to achieve domestic political goals, brings significant material benefits to both countries. Euroscepticism was accompanied by bargaining with the European Union on issues of unlocking funding; the negotiations were more successful for Viktor Orbán than Jarosław Kaczyński. As an alternative to relations with the European Union, both countries are building interaction with the United States. To legitimize their foreign policies, both Poland and Hungary systematically use references to history. But there are also significant differences in the foreign policy discourse of both countries. Hungary’s foreign policy course under Orbán is more flexible. Hungary actively cooperates with Turkey, their partnership is of a strategic nature – in particular, both countries coordinated their actions on the issue of admitting Finland and Sweden to NATO. Hungarian «Turanism» is justified by the history of the country; Poland, on the contrary, has historically positioned itself as the defender of Europe and Christianity from Turkey. Orbán has established pragmatic relations with Russia, which persist even in the conditions of a complete breakdown in relations between Russia and the «collective West», while Russian-Polish relations were frozen long before 2022. Hungary is a consistent public critic of the EU’s unambiguous bid to support Ukraine (although it has made numerous compromises with the EU as part of political bargaining), while Poland in 2022–2023. behaved less consistently, either actively supporting Ukraine or distancing itself from it before the parliamentary elections. On the American flank, Poland, despite its active rapprochement with the United States during the presidency of D. Trump, failed to achieve a change in the White House’s strategic focus on a priority partnership with Germany in favor of Poland. Hungary did not set such ambitious goals, but Orbán, unlike Kaczyński, became significantly closer personally to Trump and was betting on his return to power in 2024.
Polish foreign policy¸ Hungarian foreign policy, Jarosław Kaczyński, Viktor Orbán, Euroscepticism, Fidesz, Law and Justice.
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